The Turing Forecast

Abstract

This paper discusses the theoretical foundations of Turing's argument that machines can exhibit intelligent behavior by revisiting the key ideas in his 1950 paper «Computer Machinery and Intelligence». The aim is to demonstrate that the philosophical implications of Turing's work require a reconsideration of our own conception of intelligence while the debate over the possibility of considering machines as thinking subjects is secondary. To conduct this analysis, I follow these steps: (§2) sets the stage for evaluating the tone and apparent lightness of Turing's arguments; (§3) examines how Turing organizes the text to identify the theoretical bases and the provocative contents; (§4) explores the philosophical dimension of the ’Imitation Game’ as a thought experiment; (§5) argues that this philosophical scenario implies that human intelligence is decomposable; and (§6) concludes that Turing’s paper predicts that advances in artificial intelligence may demonstrate that our intelligence is discretes.